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THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE SOUTH SUDAN 
QUESTION: RECONSIDERING MODERATION 
The South Sudanese struggle for independence (1955-2011) was one of the more debated post-
colonial liberation wars. Not only did it challenge the sanctity of post-colonial borders, but it 
also had the potential to destabilize regional geopolitics, as South Sudan lies on major water 
sources and oil reserves. Consequently, while the South Sudanese separatists gained support 
from some African governments, many other regional actors opposed their demand for 
independence. 
One of the fiercest opponents of South Sudanese independence was the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB).1 Whilst the MB was not unique in opposing South Sudanese 
independence, it became one of the most persistent voices against it. A closer look at the MB’s 
stand on the South Sudan issue reveals an interesting fact; while the movement remained 
consistent in opposing South Sudanese independence, the way it justified this position changed 
during the years. Throughout the first decades of the war (1960s-1990s) the MB based its 
objection to South Sudanese independence (or even autonomy) primarily on religious or 
sectarian grounds, portraying the South Sudanese uprising as a Christian movement 
manipulated by the West, the churches and the mission to eradicate Islam in Africa. This 
changed in the decade preceding South Sudanese independence. The MB continued to resist 
South Sudan’s breakaway. Only now, the movement based its formal objection on practical 
grounds. Its literature moved to highlight the South Sudanese leadership’s undemocratic nature 
and lack of administrative experience, portraying an independent South Sudan as yet another 
failed state. 
This article examines this transition. The purpose here is not simply to narrate the MB’s 
agenda. Rather, this it is to contribute to the ongoing debate over the movement’s nature, and 
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especially its claims to moderation. Whereas the previous decade witnessed a tendency in the 
scholarship to describe the movement as having moderated, recent works have challenged this 
hypothesis. This article joins this latter body of work. It uses this particular case-study to 
demonstrate that even though the MB has indeed gone through some metamorphosis, we 
should be cautious about defining it as moderation. 
Admittedly, the South Sudan question may seem esoteric in comparison to other 
questions that have preoccupied the MB. Certainly, the issues of Israel/Palestine or Western 
presence in the Middle East have played far greater role on the MB’s agenda. This 
notwithstanding, the South Sudan question featured heavily in the MB’s media outlets, which 
indicates its importance for the movement’s leadership. Moreover, this apparent esotericism 
actually makes it an appealing case. It means that with regard to South Sudan the MB was 
mostly free of the constraints that characterized other issues. Therefore, we can assume that 
ideology played a much bigger role in shaping the MB’s agenda in this case.  
This research relies on an analysis of a range of primary and secondary sources. Primary 
sources include books written by leading MB thinkers and scholars; the movement’s media 
outlets, such as the Cairo-based al-Da’wa (the Call) and Liwa’ al-Islam (the Banner of Islam), 
as well as the London-based student journal Sawt al-Ghoraba (the Foreigners’ Voice); and, for 
later periods, the MB’s official website, Ikhwan Online. Analysing the MB’s agenda requires 
some great caution, since the movement is far from being a monolith.2 The MB developed 
throughout the years a pluralist structure and flexible hierarchy. This has enabled its survival 
amid government repression, but also resulted in inter-generational and ideological 
contestations within the movement.3 Primary sources do not always reflect these inner tensions. 
Secondary sources, although providing essential background information, may use primary 
sources selectively and deliver a biased image of the movement and its ideology. To mitigate 
this challenge, I have taken great care in assessing the secondary sources, comparing them to 
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primary sources and other works. The journals, magazines and books used for this research 
have all addressed the MB’s ‘target audience’, namely young educated students and 
professionals. Even if they do not always expose the tensions between the different camps 
within the movement, they do present the general message the movement has tried to convey. 
The article begins by defining moderation and examining the debate over the MB’s 
moderation. The following section discusses the general attitudes toward the South Sudan 
secessionist struggle in the Middle East. It pays some special attention to Egypt’s official stand. 
A key regional actor, Cairo traditionally resisted South Sudanese secession and even aided 
Khartoum in its counter-insurgency efforts. Yet, at later stages of the war, Cairo ended up 
revising its stand. This helps to contextualize my argument: the South Sudan question exposes 
the MB’s immoderation not because of its objection itself, but because it refused to revise its 
position even when other actors involved did. The final section examines the MB’s approach 
to the South Sudan question, from the 1960s and until the end of the MB’s brief spell in power 
in 2013. 
 
Moderation and the MB 
Much like concepts such as radicalism or extremism, the meaning of moderation often depends 
on those employing it. In the case of this article, what makes the discussion on moderation 
relevant is the fact that the MB has portrayed itself to have gone a process of moderation. But 
what does moderation actually mean in politics? Joel Olson has pointed out that social theory 
generally views the moderate as one that ‘asserts that the essence of politics is not conflict 
between friends and enemies but reasonable compromise to avoid extremes and maintain the 
ship of state’.4 Concentrating on Islamism in Yemen and Jordan, Jillian Schwedler defines 
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moderation as ‘movement from a relatively closed and rigid worldview to one more open and 
tolerant of alternative perspectives’.5 
The above two definitions correlate with the MB’s self-portrayal in recent years. 
Already during the 1970s the movement’s leadership proclaimed to embody moderate Islam in 
that, unlike other Egyptian Islamist movements, for example al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (the 
Islamic Group), it renounced the use of violence as means of achieving its social and political 
goals.6 Gradually, the movement refined this definition. During the 1990s, a new generation of 
activists gained prominence within the movement, labelled by Mona El-Ghobashy as the 
‘middle-aged generation’.7 This generation was composed primarily of the student activists of 
the 1960s-1970s. These activists, who began filling mid- and top-level positions in the 
movement during the late 1980s, had a history of collaboration with other political movements 
in Egypt, including the Wafd, Labour and Liberal parties. Reaching positions of influence, they 
approached to reform the movement. They drafted a new platform that underlined democracy 
and the rule of law as the only legitimate means of reforming state and society. It also advanced 
equality for women and non-Muslims (especially the Coptic minority). In 2005 this became 
the MB’s official programme for the national elections.8 Thus, the MB set its own standards 
for moderation. This resulted from the MB’s integration into the broader political system in 
Egypt and interaction with other parties.9 More relevant to this article’s purpose, the MB’s 
presentation of these reforms as moderation indicated that the movement’s leadership also 
understood moderation as the willingness to compromise and revise past convictions. 
Students of political Islam embraced the MB’s new image. Mona El-Ghobashey has 
maintained that the MB ‘has morphed from a highly secretive, hierarchical, antidemocratic 
organization led by anointed elders into a modern, multivocal political association steered by 
educated, savvy professionals not unlike activists of the same age in rival Egyptian political 
parties’.10 Omar Ashour has used the MB as an exemplary ‘deradicalized’ Islamist movement 
5 
 
that abandoned political violence in favour of electoral democracy and ‘political and 
ideological pluralism’.11 The fact that the MB was condemned for its policies by other Islamist 
movements bolstered its moderate image.12 This interest in the MB’s moderation stemmed 
from several factors. The MB’s transition came after September 11, at a time when 
civilizational conflict seemed imminent.13 Furthermore, the focus on the MB’s moderation 
correlated with the broader interest in deradicalization within the social sciences, which also 
looked into reforms in Catholic or socialist movements. This trend gave birth to the inclusion-
moderation hypothesis, according to which the inclusion of radical actors in political systems 
could result in their gradual moderation. Describing the MB as having gone a process of 
moderation seemed to validate this theory.14 
Most of the work on the MB’s moderation focused on its domestic agenda. This was 
not coincidental - the bulk of the movement’s activism concentrated on domestic reforms. This 
notwithstanding, international politics has been an inseparable aspect of the MB’s activism. 
Viewing the Islamic umma (community of believers) as a single unit, the movement took great 
interest in Muslim communities across the globe. The most burning international issues on the 
MB’s agenda have been the Israel/Palestine question and the Muslim World’s relations with 
the West. On both issues the MB traditionally took hard-line positions. It generally rejected 
normalization with Israel and led the opposition to the Camp David peace. It has often 
expressed hostility toward what it perceived as Western, and especially American, hegemonic 
aspirations in the region. The MB has seemed to be less divided on foreign affairs than around 
domestic affairs. This is because the movement generally believed that rather than calling for 
the overthrow of the government due to its foreign policies, it could actually pressure Cairo 
into taking action, and especially waging jihad (violent and non-violent). Subsequently, at least 
in terms of foreign policy the MB tried to operate through the government.15 
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Given this, several works have suggested that the MB could be perceived as a moderate 
on international affairs as well. Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke have claimed that the MB 
has come to rethink its traditional antipathy toward Israel. As they have noted, ‘Every Muslim 
Brotherhood leader with whom we spoke claimed a willingness to follow suit should Hamas – 
the Palestinian offshoot of the Brotherhood – recognize the Jewish state’.16 Marc Lynch’s 
analysis of the MB’s relations with the West presents a more complex take on the moderation 
hypothesis. Lynch defines moderation ‘in terms of a communicative orientation rather than in 
terms of particular political positions’.17 According to Lynch an indication for the MB’s 
moderation has been its willingness to engage in communicative action and dialogue with the 
West. Unlike strategic action, Lynch suggests, communicative action ‘requires speakers to 
make their own ideas, interests and even identities open to challenge in public debate’.18 Often 
in the past, Islamists have taken ‘a strategic approach to dialogue, one which seeks to change 
the other without putting its own views into question’.19 The atmosphere following the 
September 11 attacks incentivized Islamist thinkers to adopt a different attitude and engage in 
communicative action. The need to overcome the tragedy and the ensuing sense of distrust 
created the necessary public spheres for such engagement. Lynch uses the example of Yusuf 
al-Qaradawi. A popular theologian associated with the MB, Qaradawi has been perceived in 
the West as an extremist, partly because of his refusal to condemn suicide attacks against Israeli 
civilians or foreign forces in the Middle East. Nonetheless, Lynch documents that following 
the September 11 attacks Qaradawi has frequently advocated an open and genuine dialogue 
with the West, on the condition of Western reciprocity.20 
The hypothesis about the MB’s moderation has come under considerable criticism in 
recent studies. These works have illustrated that the MB failed to meet its own standards of 
moderation. According to Katerina Dalacoura, although the movement committed itself to the 
electoral process, it ‘has made the least progress towards moderate positions on social issues’ 
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in comparison to other, even Islamist, movements.21 In contrast to their declarations, the MB’s 
leadership, including the middle-aged leaders, did not take tangible measures toward equal 
representation for women and non-Muslims. In contradiction of its advocacy of free speech, 
Dalacoura shows, the MB acted to censor scholarly or literary works deemed offensive to 
Islam, sometimes in collaboration with the government.22 Even the MB’s commitment to the 
electoral process remained partial. In contrast to the reformists’ public endorsement of the 
electoral process, conservative circles within the movement kept viewing democracy as merely 
a way of replacing the Egyptian government. Some of these conservatives refused to use the 
term ‘democracy’, believing that sovereignty lies only within God and not the people.23 
Neither of these works has denied that the MB has transformed throughout the decades. 
But they have questioned whether this could be described as moderation. As Dalacoura puts it, 
‘If moderation is always a relative concept, the Brotherhood is clearly “moderate” in an Egypt 
which has become increasingly conservative and religious-minded over the last few decades’.24 
However, this process has far from a linear progress toward liberalism, but rather ‘a path 
marked by profound inconsistencies and contradictions, yielding agendas in which newly 
embraced themes of freedom and democracy coexist uneasily with illiberal religious concepts 
carried over from the past’.25 This could be partly blamed on the movement’s own fragmented 
nature.26 Yet, ambivalence toward democracy has also appeared among middle-aged 
reformers.27 
The rest of this article seeks to support this critique of the moderation hypothesis. It 
does so by focusing on the MB’s foreign policy stands rather than domestic agenda. Foreign 
policy involves dynamics, incentives and motivations different than those relating to domestic 
politics. The fact that the MB may have toned down on occasions its attacks on Egypt’s 
relations with Israel or the West did not signify a meaningful change, but acknowledgement of 
some need to display ambiguity. In other instances, and the South Sudan question is one such 
8 
 
case, there was not even need for such ambiguity. Looking into these dynamics can provide us 
with more comprehensive insights into the limitations of the moderation hypothesis.  
 
South Sudan in the Context of Regional Geopolitics 
The MB’s policy toward the South Sudan question did not evolve in a vacuum, but within the 
broader context of regional and international politics. The roots of the war in Sudan date to the 
process of decolonization. Independent Sudan was a consensual union of the South, whose 
population was predominantly black and practiced Christianity or shamanistic religions, and 
the mostly Arab-Muslim North. Toward independence, the government in Khartoum, which 
was almost exclusively Arab and Muslim, launched a Sudanization programme. Officially this 
meant the replacement of colonial civil servants with native ones. In practice, Sudanization 
meant the Arabization and Islamization of the whole of Sudan. Knowledge of Arabic became 
a precondition for government employment, which excluded the Southerners who gained their 
education at mission schools. Disillusioned with their prospects of integration in the new state, 
South Sudanese intellectuals, civil servants, teachers and soldiers began rising against 
Khartoum’s rule. Sporadic uprisings and clashes that erupted in the mid-1950s escalated into a 
full-scale civil war in the early 1960s, with the South Sudanese leadership now demanding 
independence. 
Throughout the war, the South Sudanese militia, the Anyanya, inflicted heavy 
casualties among the Northern security forces in an intense guerrilla warfare. In 1969 the 
Sudanese elected government was overthrown in a military coup. Sudan’s new president, 
Ga’afar al-Nimeiri, changed Khartoum’s policy and engaged in peace talks with the rebel 
leader, Joseph Lagu. In 1972 both parties signed the Addis Ababa Agreement. This agreement 
granted South Sudan wide autonomy and incorporated the rebels into the Sudanese state and 
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army. In 1983 this agreement collapsed and the war resumed. One of the main reasons for that 
was Nimeiri’s decision in 1976 to implement shari’a as a source of legislation across Sudan, 
including the South. This decision was partly inspired by his political alliance with the 
Sudanese MB and its leader, the jurist Hassan al-Turabi. While this decision had little to do 
with the Egyptian MB, the latter warmly welcomed it as an example for other governments. 
The MB’s Cairo-based al-Da’wa magazine described Sudan as ‘an exemplary beacon to be 
followed’.28 
The new round of war saw the formation of the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The SPLM/A’s leader, John Garang, revoked the Southern quest 
for independence. Instead he demanded the democratization and secularization of a federal 
Sudan. Nimeiri was toppled in 1985 and replaced by a democratically-elected government, 
which tried to reach an understanding with Garang. But in June 1989 this government was 
overthrown in another military coup. Sudan’s new ruler, Brigadier General Omar Hassan al-
Bashir, allied with Turabi and formed the National Congress Party (NCP). The NCP 
government advanced the implementation of shari’a in Sudan. The war continued until 2005 
when Bashir, now alienated from Turabi, renewed contacts with Garang. Both parties signed 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This agreement established a regional 
autonomous government in South Sudan and determined that a referendum on Southern 
independence was to be held in January 2011. In the referendum a vast majority of the 
Southerners voted for independence. On the 9th of July 2011 the Republic of South Sudan was 
declared. Khartoum was the first to recognize the new state and establish diplomatic relations 
with it. 
The South Sudanese struggle triggered Arab antagonism. Egypt in particular was 
anxious about any change in South Sudan’s status. South Sudanese secession threatened the 
post-colonial normative order that sanctified colonial borders. Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s 
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president, avowed that ‘We object to the imperialist intervention in southern Sudan, which aims 
to encourage its secession from the rest of Sudan… The breakup of southern Sudan will 
dramatically decrease Sudan’s influence in Africa, which is what the imperialists aspire to’.29 
However, Egypt had more practical reasons to worry about South Sudanese independence. The 
White Nile, one of the Nile’s two main tributaries, runs through Sudan. Cairo and Khartoum 
established stable working relations around the use of the Nile water.30 Nevertheless, this 
arrangement faced constant contestations from other states in the Nile Basin, and especially 
Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania. Cairo worried that any change in regional geopolitics could 
risk its water supply.31 Throughout the conflict, Egypt pursued the line dictated by Nasser of 
objecting South Sudanese independence. Even in 1984 Cairo’s formal position was that ‘Egypt 
rejects the secession of southern Sudan, as all these partition plans are bound to encourage 
divisive schemes in the Middle East, undermine stability and allow self-interests that are based 
on foreign plans to gain the upper-hand’.32 Cairo’s support of Khartoum was not simply 
symbolic or political. Together with Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Libya, Egypt sent military aid 
to the Sudanese government, which included the provision of both arms and training.33 Other 
Arab governments also expressed their objection to South Sudanese secession. The Ba’ath 
regime in Iraq, for instance, condemned Khartoum’s attempts to reach a compromise with the 
South, warning that ‘Closing this gate [to Africa] would threaten not only Sudan’s integrity, 
but the security of the entire Arab world’.34 
The idea of Sudan as a gate to Africa echoed in the Islamist discourse about the country. 
The MB has seen Islamization as a civilizing mission. It too viewed Sudan as a gate to 
spreading Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa.35 Mohammed Mahmud Ghali, a scholar at al-Azhar 
University and a veteran MB activist, wrote that ‘Africa south of the Sahara remained 
untouched by global civilization for centuries. The blame is on Arab Africa, which was keener 
on transferring its civilization to Europe and ignored Africa south of the Sahara’. The world, 
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he continued, ‘would have been a different place had Arab Africa not forgotten about the 
continent surrounding it and its brothers to the south’.36 The solution according to Ghali was 
to spread Islam in the continent.37 This notion paved the way to an intense MB’s campaign 
against the South Sudanese rebels. 
 
The MB and the South Sudan Question 
The 1960s-1980s: Crusaders, missionaries and Christian conspiracies 
One of the first in the MB to pay attention to events in Sudan was Sayyid Qutb, one of the 
movement’s most notable theoreticians. Perceiving the MB as spearheading a universal Islamic 
revolution to eliminate the Western-imposed nation state, Qutb advanced during the 1960s the 
idea of an Islamic civilizing mission in Africa. In his work Ma’alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones), 
which outlined his programme to apply the shari’a in modern state legislation, Qutb stated that: 
When Islam entered the centre of Africa, it clothed naked human beings, socialized 
them, brought them out of the deep recesses of isolation, and taught them the joy of 
work for exploring material resources. It brought them out of the narrow circles of tribe 
and clan into the vast circle of the Islamic community, and out of the worship of pagan 
gods into the worship of the Creator of the worlds. If this is not civilization, then what 
is it?38 
Qutb referred to the Sudan war as a civilizational war between Islam and Christianity. He 
identified the South Sudanese liberation movement as part of a Christian-missionary 
conspiracy. In his interpretation of the Quran, fi zilal al-Quarn (in the Shade of the Quran), 
Qutb maintained that Christian hostility to Islam ‘has never ended’. Counting Christian attacks 
on Muslim targets during the 1960s, Qutb stated that ‘indeed we need go no further than what 
the Christian missionaries have been trying to do in the south of the Sudan’.39 
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The idea of Southern secession as a missionary conspiracy recurred in the MB literature 
during the 1970s. Shortly after the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, an article 
in the MB’s London-based journal Sawt al-Ghoraba questioned the legitimacy of the 
agreement, claiming that the talks took place ‘under the auspices of the World Council of 
Churches’ and that representatives of the Catholic Church and Western organizations 
participated in them.40 In a following issue, the magazine claimed to expose the ‘hidden hand 
behind the curtain’ in Sudan. This article blamed nameless missionary organizations for 
instigating instability in South Sudan, claiming that the scope of relations between missionaries 
and the rebels was greater than initially assumed. It then professed that the missionaries were 
seeking to ‘Christianize the South entirely’. Hence, the article continued, ‘we can witness the 
scope of the calamity of the compromises that the Sudanese government made with the 
Christian missionaries’.41 Another commentary, entitled ‘the mission and terror in Sudan’, 
blamed Nimeiri for signing the Addis Ababa Agreement out of a desire to ally with Christian 
organizations in order to save his power.42 
This outlook on the South Sudan issue survived well after the collapse of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement and Nimeiri’s downfall. When the interim government that replaced Nimeiri 
initiated talks with the SPLM/A, al-Da’wa warned of the ‘Crusaders’ attack’ on Sudan, alluding 
to the SPLM/A.43 The SPLM/A and Garang employed mainly a Marxist terminology, at least 
partly in order to please their patron, the Marxist Derg regime in Ethiopia. Moreover, up until 
the early 2000s the SPLM/A advocated a united and democratic Sudan, rather than a 
secessionist agenda. This did not prevent the MB from continuously referring to the Southern 
insurgents and their leader as ‘Christian’. One al-Da’wa report discussed the ‘Christian John 
Garang’ and asserted that ‘it is well known that John Garang’s movement is a Christian one, 
aiming to separate the South from the rest of Sudan and turn it into a Christian enclave’.44 
Southern insurgency was described as ‘the strikes of the Christian minority in the South’.45 
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The 1989 coup and the ascent of the NCP government in Khartoum intensified these 
attacks. As the South Sudanese rebels presented their demands to the new government, Liwa’ 
al-Islam, another MB monthly printed in Cairo, recounted that ‘the South Sudanese fanatic 
John Garang exposed his ambitions. Unsurprisingly, he still receives international aid from the 
churches, as well as both capitalist and communist states’. The report protested against 
Garang’s demand to ‘take part in ruling the whole of Sudan through participating in the 
government’ and to ‘rebuild the army in order to integrate rebel soldiers’.46 A following issue 
quoted the al-Azhar scholar Abdel Wadoud Shalabi’s statement that 
The South Sudan problem has been caused mainly by the global mission. The churches 
have a fundamental role in stirring enmity and war. The fanatic West and the 
Communist East are also behind the rebel John Garang, providing him with money and 
arms… the global powers that conspire against Islam use the rebel movement they 
sponsor to abolish the Islamic shari’a in Sudan.47 
This treatment of the South Sudanese rebellion continued well into the 1990s. In his 
1990 delineation of the ‘priorities of the Islamic Movement in the coming phase’, Qaradawi 
referred several times to the war in Sudan as a key subject in Islam’s relations with the West. 
He maintained that ‘[Western] thought and perception of us [the Muslims] is still inspired by… 
the spirit of the crusaders… as could be seen in its attitude toward the issues of southern Sudan, 
Eritrea, Kashmir, the Philippines and other issues of relevance to political Islam’.48 Elsewhere 
in the book Qaradawi declared that a condition for any Muslim-Christian dialogue is that ‘the 
Church ceases to aid the Christians against the Muslims in every conflict, such as the ones in 
southern Sudan, the Philippines and others’.49 
Some of the MB’s allegations were not necessarily false, but rather grossly distorted. 
True, the South Sudanese won the sympathy of the Catholic Church and the World Council of 
Churches (WCC). Nonetheless, these bodies’ intervention in the conflict was limited. The 
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WCC did mediate between Nimeiri and Lagu, but it was one among other actors, including the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie.50 
Furthermore, the MB overlooked the fact that, especially after 1983, the Southern insurgents 
had a large Muslim following, especially in the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile. Although 
the majority of Nuba are Muslims, al-Da’wa chose to emphasize the role of a Nubian Episcopal 
priest, Father Philip Abbas Ghaboush, in orchestrating the ‘racist rebellion’ and ‘conspiracy’ 
against Sudan.51 
One may point out the general antipathy toward secession in the post-colonial era as 
shaping the MB’s outlook of events in Sudan. Yet, this was not the case. The MB never 
sanctified the post-colonial borders. In its earlier decades the movement actually rejected this 
territorial division within the Muslim World. In other cases it expressed support of Muslim 
separatist movements in post-colonial states, including Eritrea, the Philippines, Thailand or 
Kashmir.52 Mustafa Mashhur, later to become the MB’s al-murshid al-‘am (Supreme Guide), 
wrote in 1986 that ‘The problems of the Islamic world, such as [in]… Eritrea or the 
Philippines… are not problems of land and peoples… but of Islam and the Muslims, and they 
can be resolved by neither negotiations nor recognition of the enemy’s right to the Islamic land 
he stole’.53 It was perhaps this Islamist antagonism toward the idea of a non-Muslim rule over 
Muslims that shaped the MB’s perceptions. In this fashion, Muhammad al-Sawi, another 
prominent thinker associated with the MB, argued in 1992 that non-Muslims cannot obtain 
sovereignty over Muslims.54 Having been subjected to Khartoum’s rule for nearly two 
centuries, South Sudan could not be allowed to reverse this reality.55 The 2000s, nonetheless, 





The MB and Post-CPA South Sudan 
After some military setbacks during the 1990s, the SPLM/A recuperated during the early 
2000s. Its well-orchestrated campaign eventually drove Bashir to initiate the CPA. The change 
in Sudan, and especially in the NCP government’s position, drove other neighbouring 
governments to reassess their position on the South Sudan question. Most notable was Egypt 
under Hosni Mubarak’s presidency that ‘accepted the fact that [South Sudanese] independence 
was inevitable’.56 This was a gradual process and during the CPA Cairo remained alert.57 But 
in June 2011, the semi-official al-Ahram newspaper published an article reassuring the readers 
that Egypt will not face any risk to its water supply from geopolitical changes at the Nile Basin. 
It confirmed that ‘an increase in Egypt’s share of the Nile water relies on the stability and 
security of the states on the sources of Nile, and especially South Sudan’.58 Symbolically, Egypt 
was the second state, after Sudan, to recognize the Republic of South Sudan. On the referendum 
day, al-Ahram conveyed the SPLM/A’s message that ‘we will not be part of any hostility 
against the Arab states’.59 The provisional Egyptian government under the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces committed to cooperate with the new state and help it develop its 
infrastructure. 
Amid these developments, the MB resumed its attacks against South Sudanese 
secession. During this period the MB’s discourse began changing, moving to justify its 
opposition to South Sudanese secession by referring to practical grounds. Instead of describing 
the South Sudanese struggle for independence as a Christian conspiracy against Islam, MB 
outlets moved to highlight the non-democratic nature of the Southern leadership and the 
economic unviability of the landlocked South Sudanese state. They also portrayed South Sudan 
as a hub of ethnic conflicts, whose endemic violence and instability could project on the entire 
region, including Egypt. One of the first articles on Ikhwan Online concerning South Sudan 
told the readers that the post-CPA South Sudanese authorities were embezzling oil income: 
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Whilst some members of the Southern movements accuse the North of stealing the 
Southern share of oil income, the figures show that the Southerners have received three 
billion dollars out of a gross income of eleven billion dollars… Southerners who had 
returned [from the North] to the South found nothing and returned to the North... Every 
Sudanese now asks where have the 3 billion gone?60 
Other reports aimed to demonstrate that the South Sudanese leadership could not 
control outbursts of violence.61 One of these reports quoted a NCP member of parliament 
saying that ‘the South is trying to cover up its security shortcomings’.62 Another report stated 
that 
Local officials and residents warned of an escalation in tribal feuds in the South, 
because of the SPLM’s failure to provide the population with basic food and security 
and to solve the tribal disputes over grazing land, cattle, and water sources. This 
indicates the [local population’s] fears of South Sudan’s fate under an independent 
Southern administration.63 
The MB also blamed the South Sudanese leadership of systematically persecuting the 
Muslim minority in the South. Ikhwan Online reported that following the CPA, Southern 
Muslims felt ‘marginalized by the government in Khartoum in the North and by the SPLM that 
rules the South’. It added that they ‘are now facing ruthless Christianization campaigns and 
periods of political and religious persecution’.64 The website quoted Abdel Rahim Ali, a 
member of the NCP’s Executive Leadership, asserting that ‘Secession would mean new 
problems instead of the old ones. The border between the South and the North will become 
more dangerous, and there will be a war between the Southern tribes on the North’s southern 
borders’. He added that 
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The Southerners do not have political experience that allows them to build a state. This 
has been confirmed by a number of international observers. The Southern citizens have 
lived since independence under Northern administration, while the Southern leaders 
had been preoccupied with military action and guerrilla war. When the CPA was signed, 
the leadership of the South fell into the hands of guerrilla leaders… who discovered 
that state-building is a completely different thing.65 
This line of argument became popular especially among the MB’s middle-aged leaders. 
A notable commentator on the South Sudan issue was Essam el-Erian, then a member of 
parliament for the MB bloc and of the movement’s Guidance Bureau.66 Commenting on the 
CPA, Erian wrote that the SPLM/A ‘is objected by other Southern movements and does not 
represent the majority of people and tribes in the South’. South Sudanese independence, Erian 
warned, would result in tribal feuds in the South, war with the North and a refugee crisis.67 
Osama Gado, a MB member of parliament from Alexandria, cautioned that South Sudan ‘is 
Egypt’s strategic depth’ and that its secession would constitute a ‘threat to Egypt’s water 
sources, as it would put Nile water at the hands of the rebels’.68 Khaled Ouda, a geologist 
described as ‘one of the MB’s leaders in the Asyut Province’, alerted Ikhwan Online’s readers 
that ‘Egypt is most likely to be affected by the dangers of draught and desertification if 
secession is to occur’.69 
This change of discourse reflected the transition in the MB’s perception of domestic 
politics. On the surface, the MB applied to the South Sudan question the same standards it 
claimed to adhere to at home. Again, the MB’s description of the reality in South Sudan was 
not entirely exaggerated. Ethnic violence has been endemic in South Sudan and the local 
leadership often proved unable or unwilling to uproot this phenomenon. But in reality, violence 
and human rights violations did not prevent the MB from supporting other liberation 
movements. The Muslim liberation movements in Eritrea and the Philippines have already been 
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mentioned. To this one can add the MB’s support of Palestinian Hamas, which has displayed 
authoritarian tendencies since taking over the Gaza Strip in 2006.70 This is not to criticize the 
MB for practicing realpolitik, but to prove that these moral considerations did not play a 
significant role in the MB’s perception of international affairs. Of course, practicing realpolitik 
does not render the MB immoderate of extremist. Neither is the use of a certain discourse. It is 
the fact that in the case of South Sudan the MB actually did not practice realpolitik. In spite of 
a rapidly changing reality, the MB refused to revise its policies. Even after Sudan, Egypt and 
other OAU members accepted South Sudan’s secession, thus taking the edge off the 
apocalyptic description of South Sudan’s secession as a security catastrophe, the MB stuck to 
its position of objecting any change to the existing status quo. 
The practical discourse, then, did not genuinely reflect the MB’s view of the South 
Sudan issue. If geopolitical considerations and fears for South Sudan’s political nature cannot 
explain the MB’s stand, what other explanations remain? One potential explanation may relate 
to the MB’s desire to protect its reputation. As an opposition movement aiming to lead the 
Egyptian public, reputation has been one of the MB’s most important resources. Indeed, works 
on community politics have highlighted the function of reputation as a resource of local 
politicians, especially in the opposition.71 For the MB, similarly to other Islamist movements, 
‘resistance to foreign domination of Muslim lands and people’ has been an important source 
of legitimacy and credibility.72 Based on this logic, one could suspect that the MB leadership 
may have worried that compromising on South Sudan may risk their image as fighting for the 
global Islamic cause, and undermine their ability of protecting more burning issues, such as 
that of Palestine. The MB’s history, nonetheless, invalidates this counterfactual. After all, the 
MB did not hesitate to declare (even if not fully implement) reforms in its conduct in domestic 
politics which led to its integration in Egyptian national politics. This even though this move 
triggered harsh criticism by other Islamist movements. 
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If we accept that practical considerations did not actually guide the MB’s stand, then 
we are left with an ideological explanation, namely that the same religiously-infused logic 
continued to guide the MB’s approach to the South Sudan question, in spite of the change in 
rhetoric. This assertion is buttressed by the fact that as South Sudanese independence became 
imminent, the more conservative sectarian discourse reappeared. Qaradawi, for example, was 
cited by Ikhwan Online as calling for ‘resistance to the missionary campaign that the West 
leads throughout the Muslim states, and especially in South Sudan’. He blamed this 
intervention with ‘hindering the spread of Islamic awakening among Muslims’.73 He then 
concluded: 
The South Sudan subject is not a question of civil war, but a global conspiracy to 
marginalize Arabism and Islam. It is fed by many regional and global actors, headed by 
global Zionism and the crusaders. It does not target Sudan alone, as South Sudan is 
Islam’s and Arabism’s gate to Africa.74 
Similar discourse was employed by the movement’s recently-appointed Supreme Guide, 
Mohammed Badi’. In October 2010 Badi’ issued a newsletter entitled ‘The Conspiracy against 
the Islamic World continues’. In the newsletter, Badi’ described South Sudanese secession as 
‘the first step in the plan to revise the map of the Middle East’. The West, Badi’ warned, wishes 
to gain control over Sudan’s oil and Egypt’s water resources. He then added that ‘this started 
in Sudan because it is the largest Arab state, extending to the heart of Africa. It has been a 
historical strategic Arab and Islamic passage into Africa… This is in order to set a bulwark 
between the Arab and Islamic world and the African people’.75 In another case, a group of 
‘ulama (religious scholars) pleaded the ‘Arab people and rulers to stand shoulder to shoulder 
against Zionist schemes against Sudan… a beloved part of the Islamic world’.76 
But these were not just Qaradawi, Badi’ and the ‘ulama, perceived as representing the 
MB’s old guard or more conservative circles, who resorted to this sectarian discourse. Erian, 
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considered a representative of the middle-aged camp,77 also employed this discourse amid the 
crisis. Encouraging a united front against the South Sudanese referendum, he wrote that ‘The 
secessionist state, instead of being a Sudanese bridge to the heart of Africa would become a 
buffer controlled by the churches and the WCC. This would prevent Islamic enlightenment 
from reaching those thirsty for faith’.78 Emphasizing that the SPLM/A is backed by ‘the Zionist 
entity and the United States’, Erian warned that ‘the conspirators will not stop at tearing the 
rest of Sudan apart… they will move against Egypt’.79 Shortly after, Erian lamented that ‘it is 
clear to anyone with eyes in his head that the United States and its allies, and especially the 
Zionist enemy, have planned a road map for Sudan for many years now, to create a state in the 
South’.80 Similarly, Khaled Ouda, another member of the middle-aged generation, albeit 
speaking of national security, reverted to a religious discourse when he pleaded the Egyptian 
government to declare jihad in Sudan in order to ‘prevent the secession of South Sudan and 
any infringement of the Blue Nile’.81 
In short then, the MB’s ideological outlook did not genuinely change. In fact, the South 
Sudan question seemed to have enjoyed some consensus among different circles within the 
movement, in a way other subjects did not. This consensus clearly emerged at the MB’s 
political campaign in 2011. The programme of the MB’s front party, hizb al-hurriyya wa-l-
‘adala (Freedom and Justice Party, hereafter FJP), released in February 2011, discussed South 
Sudan as one of the key issues on the Egyptian agenda. The programme declared that 
‘Restoring Egypt’s pioneering position in its Arabic and Islamic environments is our first 
priority.’ It then continued: ‘Egypt’s withdrawal from its African environment is the reason for 
many of the problems [facing Egypt], including that of the Nile Valley, South Sudan’s 
secession and the Darfur question’.82 Here, the South Sudan question was also bound with that 
of Palestine, as the other major concern facing Egypt.83 
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The FJP’s electoral victory in November 2011 and the election of the party’s candidate, 
Mohammed Morsi, for presidency seemingly provided the MB with the opportunity to 
implement its plans, domestically and internationally. In reality the new government failed to 
alter the previous regime’s policies. The MB’s hostility toward peace with Israel and 
resentment toward American presence in the Middle East persisted. The new government 
strengthened its ties with the Hamas government in Gaza and Morsi refrained from travelling 
to Washington and meet President Barack Obama. But this stopped with these gestures and the 
FJP government avoided annulling Camp David or downgrading Egypt’s formal cooperation 
with Washington. This was also the case with South Sudan. The MB did not change its line 
toward South Sudan. During the preparation for the elections, when asked in an interview on 
FJP’s position on the subject, Erian affirmed that ‘We need a united Sudan, a safe Sudan, a 
secure Sudan for all Sudanese in Darfur and in east and in south... We support Sudan for 
keeping security because it is a matter of national interest for us’.84 Yet, in this case as well 
Morsi did not alter the previous regime’s policy. In 2013 Morsi held a meeting with the South 
Sudanese President, Salva Kiir Mayardit, during the African Summit in Addis Ababa. In this 
meeting Morsi committed to continue the cooperation between Egypt and South Sudan on the 
issues of electricity, health and education.85 Morsi’s appointed Prime Minister, Hesham Kandil, 
also travelled to South Sudan to discuss water issues.86 It is interesting to note here that Morsi, 
while holding an official visit to Khartoum in April 2013, did not continue to Juba. This in 
contrast to Hosni Mubarak, who in 2008 supplemented his visit to Khartoum with an official 
visit to South Sudan, where he convened with Kiir. 
While at first sight these policies seem to support the MB’s moderation hypothesis, in 
practice this is not the case. The MB simply did not have the opportunity to revise Egypt’s 
foreign policy. Upon coming to power, the MB concentrated its resources on domestic affairs, 
and especially constitutional reforms. As Elizabeth Iskander Monier and Annette Ranko argue, 
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‘because the MB was consumed with managing the domestic political transition, it did not have 
the capacity to make any significant moves on the foreign-policy level either’.87 Moreover, 
according to Ewan Stein, ‘The 25 January 2011 “revolution” had by no means dislodged the 
incumbent regime. The security forces, large parts of the bureaucracy, judiciary and media, and 
of course the military all remained in place and influential’.88 This left the new government 
with the option of using these existing institutions and immerse itself in domestic politics. 
Consequently, in the field of foreign policy, ‘the Brotherhood continued to behave like a loyal 
opposition movement despite having won both parliamentary and presidential elections’.89 
A military coup in July 2013 removed Morsi from power and suspended the FJP-
dominated parliament. One may suggest that had Morsi and the FJP government remained in 
power, the minor gestures mentioned above would have paved the way to a more substantial 
change in the MB’s stand on international affairs. This, however, remains a counterfactual. 
Given the evidences, Morsi’s conduct did not indicate an alteration of his movement’s 
traditional stances. Some hint into the MB’s foreign policy agenda is provided by Nafidhat 
Misr (Egypt’s Window), another website addressing the younger generation of MB supporters; 
a piece in 2014 suggested that South Sudanese secession was a prelude to Washington’s 
scheme to establish a Coptic state in Alexandria.90 
 
Conclusion 
It is necessary to stress again that this article does not deny that the MB has gone through a 
transformation over the years. It does question the extent to which we could actually describe 
this as moderation. If we go back to the definitions of moderation offered by Schwedler, Olson 
and Lynch, we can isolate two intertwined important elements: willingness to reconsider 
traditional stances against a changing reality, and to engage in some dialogue with other actors. 
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These elements recur implicitly in the MB’s definition of moderation. The recognition of state 
institutions and the electoral process as the mechanisms leading to change was a far cry from 
the agenda that guided the MB not too long ago. Yet, recent works have demonstrated that the 
MB’s readiness to change its political conduct in Egypt has been far from linear, and that its 
achievements could at best be considered as relative to the increasingly conservative Egyptian 
society. The dissonance between the moderation hypothesis advanced by the MB and some 
observers and the MB’s actions on the ground becomes even more apparent in foreign policy 
issues. The MB’s approach to the South Sudan question reflects this vividly. For decades the 
MB remained intransigent in its opposition to South Sudanese secession, even when conditions 
changed. The change of discourse did not indicate a policy shift; in fact, even this 
transformation remained limited. Albeit the so-called reforms in the movement, the MB’s stand 
on the South Sudan subject was shaped by its religious thinking. 
At the time of writing this article, the MB is once again persecuted by the Egyptian 
authorities. After a brief spell in power, in which the FJP-led government generally failed in 
launching any major reform, the MB leaders are now standing for trial, facing possible death 
sentences. One may question the logic of investigating the MB’s policies, let alone its agenda 
on international affairs, at this point. My reply would be that even in its depleted state, the 
MB’s ideology remains influential, appealing to wide segments of Egyptian and Middle 
Eastern populations. The MB had been oppressed in the past and resurrected. It may recuperate, 
in one way or another. But even if it does not, the MB’s ideas and ideology will not simply 
evaporate. They are bound to remain influential. Therefore, studying them continues to be a 
priority for anyone who studies regional geopolitics. The study of the movement’s stand on the 
South Sudan question provides us with a convenient case for challenging some popular 
conventions about the MB’s ideology. 
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Beyond its main goal, the article paves the way to further investigation. Not much has 
been written so far on the MB’s stands on international affairs. Even more so, very little has 
been written on the link between the MB’s core mission of spreading its model of governance 
and its approach to foreign policy issues. Even less has been written on the MB’s views on its 
role in Sub-Saharan Africa, which, this article demonstrated, actually became a recurring theme 
in the MB’s political thought. This work could serve as a useful starting point for future 
research on these subjects. 
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